Japanese Society and Culture
Volume 4

Article 11

3-31-2022

A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread of the
‘Symbol’ within the Constitution of Japan: Japan’s Approach to
Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power
Yoshiaki Shimojo
Faculty of Law, Asahi University

Follow this and additional works at: https://gensoken.toyo.ac.jp/japanese-society-and-culture
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shimojo, Yoshiaki (2022) "A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread of the ‘Symbol’
within the Constitution of Japan: Japan’s Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power,"
Japanese Society and Culture: Vol. 4, Article 11.
DOI: 10.52882/2434-1738-04-11
Available at: https://gensoken.toyo.ac.jp/japanese-society-and-culture/vol4/iss1/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institute of Social Sciences. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Japanese Society and Culture by an authorized editor of Institute of Social Sciences.

A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread of the ‘Symbol’ within the Constitution of Japan:
Japan’s Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power 141

【Received 30 September 2021 / Revised 15 0ctober 2021 / Accepted 30 0ctober 2021】

A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread
of the ‘Symbol’ within the Constitution of Japan: Japan’s
Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power
Yoshiaki Shimojo ※
Abstract
Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates a symbolic emperor system based on popular
sovereignty, stating that “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People,
deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” In the post-war
period, the symbolic emperor system of the Constitution of Japan developed in its own way through
shrewd adaptation and harmonization with popular sovereignty, within the context of Japan’s particular
political climate.
Nineteenth-century European monarchies comprised several types of constitutional monarchy, such
as the German-style “constitutional monarchy,” the British-style “parliamentar y monarchy,” and the
French-style “moderative power monarchy”. Comparable to these, the symbolic emperor system formed
under the Constitution of Japan in the latter half of the 20th century can be said to present a new genre of
modern monarchy that we may refer to as a “symbolic monarchy.”
Based on this viewpoint, this article examines the structural shift to the symbolic emperor system
of the Constitution of Japan from the Meiji Emperor system based on divine decree sovereignty, and the
meaning and function of the “symbol” in the Constitution of Japan. Moreover, I will consider the origins
of the symbolic emperor system and its traditional Japanese characteristics by examining the origin,
acceptance, and international spread of the “symbol” provision in Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan.
Keywords: Constitution of Japan, Symbol, Symbolic Monarchy, Symbolic Emperor System, Emperor Shōwa

Introduction
The symbolic emperor system, implemented under the Constitution of Japan, will soon have been in
place for 75 years. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan stipulates a symbolic emperor system based on
popular sovereignty, stating that “The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the
People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.”
Constitutional theory in Japan initially regarded the emperor system as inconsistent with popular
sovereignty in principle, and it was thought that it would eventually disappear from the stage of world
histor y as democratization progressed. However, the symbolic emperor system of the Constitution
of Japan has developed in its own way through shrewd adaptation and harmonization with popular
sovereignty, within the context of Japan’s particular political climate(1). Various opinion polls indicate that
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the symbolic emperor system is broadly established in the public consciousness of Japan (2).
Looking back on the histor y of monarchy, in the 19 th centur y Europe we find several types of
constitutional monarchy, such as the German-style “constitutional monarchy,” the British-style
“parliamentar y monarchy,” and the French-style “moderative-power monarchy” (3). Comparable to
these, the symbolic emperor system formed under the Constitution of Japan in the latter half of the 20tn
century can be said to present a new genre of modern monarchy that we may refer to as a “symbolic
monarchy.” According to Isao Sato, a leading scholar of monarchies, symbolic monarchy refers to “a
system of monarchy that acknowledges the existence of a monarch, yet gives the monarch no authority
over national affairs, such that they have only the function of symbolizing the unity of the people and the
permanence of the state, both mentally and psychologically” (4).
This article will consider the origins of the symbolic emperor system and its traditional Japanese
characteristics by examining the origin, acceptance, and international spread of the “symbol” provision in
Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan.
1. The Structural Shift to the Symbolic Emperor System
It is commonly known that the symbolic emperor system of the Constitution of Japan was established
as a result of a political compromise between the Japanese government and the General Headquarters
of the Allied Powers (GHQ) under the occupation of Japan that began at the end of August 1945. Due
to these unique circumstances, the principle of legitimacy of the emperor system would undergo a
fundamental shift in tandem with the transition from a system based on the Meiji Constitution to one
based on the Constitution of Japan (5).
The Meiji Constitution (the Constitution of the Empire of Japan) stipulates that “The Empire of Japan
shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal” (Article 1), and “The
Emperor shall be sacred and inviolable” (Article 3), and “The Emperor shall be the head of the Empire
and shall exercise the rights of sovereignty according to the provisions of this Constitution” (Article 4).
In other words, the Emperor was the sacred and inviolable head of state, belonging to an unbroken line
spanning centuries, and holding the sovereign authority to control all the actions of the state, including
those of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. In the imperial edict in the
preface to the Meiji Constitution, the Meiji Emperor states, “The great rights of sovereignty of the State,
We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We
nor they shall in future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby
granted.” In this way, the ultimate basis for the Emperor to rule over Japan was the “divine decree/
prophecy” (shinchoku) given by the deity Amaterasu Ōmikami, according to which, the emperor was
her direct descendant, whose grandson had descended from the heavens to rule over Japan as the first
Emperor (i.e., divine decree sovereignty) (6).
The symbolic emperor system of the Constitution of Japan was an attempt to completely reverse the
structure of sovereignty that had existed under the Meiji Constitution, which had positioned the Emperor
as an absolute ruler and wielder of sovereignty. The Preamble to the Constitution of Japan states that
“sovereign power resides with the people,” and Article 1 states that the position of the Emperor “shall
be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People.” The Emperor’s position is in turn “[derived]
from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power,” thereby stipulating a symbolic emperor
system based on popular sovereignty. Articles 41,65 and Article 76, paragraph 1 stipulate that legislative
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power belongs to the National Diet, administrative power belongs to the Cabinet, and judicial power
belongs to the courts, respectively.
Consequently, the Emperor’s powers are limited to formal and ceremonial “acts in matters of state,”
and he is not permitted to hold political authority: he “shall not have powers related to government”
(Ar ticle 4, paragraph 1). Based on the principle of popular sovereignty, the GHQ envisaged that
sovereignty would be exercised by the “three branches of government” – the National Diet, the Cabinet,
and the Judiciary - which would be the “agents (or representatives)” of the sovereign people, and that
doing so would limit the role of the Emperor to a symbolic position as a “social monarch” (7).
2. The Meaning and Function of the “Symbol” in the Constitution of Japan
We may, then, ask how the Emperor is expected to act, being in a symbolic position yet prohibited
from holding or exercising political power.
In general, the word “symbol” means “an action or medium by which something abstract, intangible,
or unrelated to sensory perception is manifested in something concrete, tangible, or related to sensory
perception” (8), or “something concrete and tangible that evokes something abstract or intangible” (9).
For example, the dove is a symbol of peace, the heart is a symbol of love, and the cross is a symbol of
Christianity. Etymologically, the word “symbol” is derived from the Greek word symbolon, a compound
word comprised of sym (“together”) and ballein (“fall into a particular state”), which refers to a sign from
which one infers a particular thing(10). When we cannot easily imagine something abstract, we perform
the mental action of imagining something abstract using something concrete as a medium: this higherorder mental action is what we may refer to as a symbolic action, which may be something that only
humans are capable of.
The stipulation in Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan that the Emperor “shall be the symbol of
the State and of the unity of the People” is intended to have the social-psychological effect of causing a
majority of people to recall or feel unity or solidarity as the nation of Japan or as the Japanese people,
when they see or think about the Emperor, thereby, confirming that they are Japanese people (11). In this
sense, the relationship between that which symbolizes (i.e., the Emperor) and that which is symbolized
(i.e., the Japanese state, or the people of Japan) is historical, ethnic and social, and to that extent, it does
not have a legal meaning.
It naturally follows that in order for any constitution or constitutional system to be successfully
implemented and operated, a certain degree of integration in terms of the state or people must be
ensured. That being so, in the case of the Constitution of Japan, we may ask what the characteristics of
the unifying action are, which the Emperor exerts as a symbol in relation to the state and the people.
On this issue, the Emperor, as a symbol, is sometimes likened to a mirror that reflects the reality of
the unity of the state and the people as it is (i.e., passive symbolism). Isao Sato, who has adopted this
position, describes the function of the “symbol” in the Constitution of Japan as follows.
... The function of the symbol, or rather the reason why a symbol is symbolic, is that the symbol
expresses and makes manifest the meaning that exists within that which is symbolized. That is to
say, the symbol makes manifest the meaning of that which is symbolized as a given and as it is; as
such, we may say that the symbol does this faithfully without affecting that which is symbolized in
any way. In this sense, I have likened symbols to a mirror, insofar as a mirror reflects a person’s face
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as it is. The mirror cannot change the face of the person who is being reflected by emitting some
physical force from within itself .... Therefore, I put it that the Emperor can only be a symbol of the
unity of state of Japan and the Japanese people insofar as he faithfully embodies that unity as it is,
without exerting an influence on the state of Japan or on the Japanese people – if Japan turns red,
then he embodies red Japan as it is, and if it turns white, then he embodies white Japan as it is. (12)
It should be noted here that in the case of the Constitution of Japan, the fact of the unity of the state
of Japan and the Japanese people, which the Emperor reflects as a “symbol,” is in no way politically
colorless and transparent; rather, it is necessarily rooted in the fundamental concept of the Constitution of
Japan. That is to say, the provisions of the Constitution that establish the Emperor as a symbol are a kind
of declaration of political intention that is premised on and is intended to work based on the general and
shared aspects of the people’s constitutional consciousness – what we may refer to as “the general will of
the people” –, such as pacifism, international cooperation, popular sovereignty (democracy), respect for
fundamental human rights, and public welfare (13).
Therefore, unlike physical symbols, such as national flags, national anthems, and national emblems,
the Emperor, who is a “personified symbol,” is naturally required to have the attitude and actions that
are appropriate as a symbol of the Constitution of Japan, as well as the responsibilities that accompany it.
For example, if the Emperor were to publicly state his opinions supporting or criticizing the government
or a particular political party, or if he were to run for a particular political party during an election, such
actions would likely damage his political neutrality, and would therefore violate his position as a symbol
with no “powers related to government” (Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Constitution) and bearing no
political responsibility (Article 3 of the Constitution) (14). Similarly, if the Emperor were to wear a military
uniform, as stipulated under the Meiji Constitution, regardless of whether he wore it in public or in
private, such an action would run counter to the pacifist principles of the Constitution.
3. The Three Origins of the “Symbol” Provision
Various perspectives have been put forth regarding the origin of the word “symbol” in Article 1 of
the Constitution of Japan. Below, we consider this topic from three angles: the British, Japanese, and
American routes.
The British Route
It is generally known that the draft of the Constitution of Japan was prepared in approximately nine
days at the Government Section of the GHQ in early February 1946. At that time, eight subcommittees
were set up to draft the new constitution of Japan, including the Subcommittee on the Provisions relating
to the Emperor, Treaties and Authorities. According to George A. Nelson’s testimony in later years (then,
a lieutenant in the army), who was thought to have been the originator of the symbol provision within the
aforementioned subcommittee, he had in mind at that time The English Constitution (first published in
1867), a work by Walter Bagehot (1826 － 1877) (15).
According to Bagehot’s classic text, the British monarchs of the latter half of the 19th century had
the following characteristics. First, the king occupies a position of dignity, the effect of which cannot
be calculated; if the king does not exist, the government would collapse and disappear. Second, while
the people may be divided into political parties, the king must transcend this and keep a distance from

A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread of the ‘Symbol’ within the Constitution of Japan:
Japan’s Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power 145

actual political disputes, thus preserving the mystery of the monarchy and distancing it from enmity or
disgrace. Third, this allows the king to serve as a means to combine competing political parties and to be
a “visible symbol of unity” for those with less education (16).
In addition, according to the recollection of Richard A. Poole (then, a naval ensign) who was in
charge of the chapter of the Constitution on “the Emperor” in the abovementioned Subcommittee on
the Provisions relating to the Emperor, Treaties and Authorities, the word “symbol” was adopted from
the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which stipulates the free association between the member states of the
Commonwealth of Nations (17). The preamble to the Statute states that “the Crown is the symbol of the
free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and … they are united by a
common allegiance to the Crown.” This demonstrates that members of the GHQ drafting committees,
whether Nelson or Poole, used the British constitutional monarchy as a model in drafting the Constitution
of Japan.
The Japanese Route
We must also remember that even in prewar Japan, from the Taisho democracy period onward, there
were those advocating a view of the Emperor and the imperial family as “symbols of the unity of the
people.” Regarding this point, Inazō Nitobe (1862 － 1933) asserts in his famous 1900 English-language
work, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, “of English royalty—that it ‘is not only the image of authority, but the
author and symbol of national unity,’ as I believe it to be, doubly and trebly may this be affirmed of royalty
in Japan” (18). Nitobe also argues in his 1931 book, Japan: Some Phases of her Problems and Development,
in an expression reminiscent of Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan, that, “the Emperor is thus the
representative of the nation and the symbol of its unity” (19).
Next, the works of historical expert Sōkichi Tsuda (1873 － 1961) are notable in this regard. In

Bungaku ni Arawaretaru Kokumin Shisō no Kenkyū (An Enquiry into the Japanese Mind as Mirrored in
Literature) published from 1916, even at this early stage, Tsuda defines the Emperor and the imperial
family variously as, “a symbol of the state, possessing eternal life,” “a symbol of the independence and
unity of the state,” and “a living symbol of the national spirit,” as follows:
Thus, the imperial family is eternal with the state, and even in times when Japan was to a great
extent politically divided as in the Warring States period, we are proud of the existence of the
imperial family and will continue to retain such pride forever. Therefore, in modern terms, the
imperial family may be described as a symbol of the state, possessing eternal life, a symbol of the
independence and unity of the state, and a symbol of the national spirit. … The imperial family was
not involved in politics, and thus it was able to adapt well to and tolerate the political forms and
social organizations that changed according to the times, always remaining an unchanging symbol
of the state and a living symbol of the national spirit. (20)
In addition, in Januar y 1946, the year after the war end, when the Constitution of Japan had not
yet been drafted, Tsuda published an essay entitled “ Kenkoku no Jijō to Banseiikkei no Shisō” (“The
Circumstances of the Founding of the Nation and the Concept of Unbroken Imperial Lineage”) in the
April issue of the magazine Sekai, published by Iwanami Shoten. In the essay, he developed what are
referred to as the “our emperor theory” (warera no tennō-ron) and “our imperial family theory” (warera
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no kōshitsu-ron) and caused significant controversy in doing so. He argued that the imperial family’s
raison d’être in the still-developing postwar “democratic state” was to occupy a position at “the center of
unity among the people and a living symbol of the national spirit,” as follows:
... In modern times, the people themselves are to be responsible for the governance of the state,
and this is the political idea of what we refer to as democracy. This idea, and the positioning of the
imperial family as the rulers of the nation, are based not on the imperial family occupying a position
that is in opposition to the people and looked on by the people from the outside, but is instead
within the people and embodies the will of the people, bringing about harmony by governing in
such a sense. From the point of view of the people, this can be done by bringing about a thorough
implementation of democracy. If the people preside over the state in its entirety, the imperial
family will naturally exist within the people and become as one with the people. Specifically, the
significance of the existence of the imperial family lies in their being at the center of the unity of the
people and existing as a living symbol of the national spirit. (21)
The American Route
Finally, turning our attention to the American route, let us start by discussing the influence of Joseph
Clark Grew (1880 － 1965), who was the United States (US) Ambassador to Japan during the outbreak of
war between the US and Japan; he was also deeply involved in the preparation of the Potsdam Declaration
as the US Under Secretar y of State at the end of the war. He returned to the US immediately after
the start of the war between Japan and the United States, where he gave lectures at various locations
across the country, discussing issues relating to the retention of the emperor system in Japan after the
war. Based on the idea that, after the war, the US and Japan could return to the cooperative relations of
the 1920s, Grew expressed the view that “the emperor system could play an important role in Japan’s
peaceful and constructive development, and in enabling the Japanese people to move in a direction that is
compatible with the security of the United States” (22). Regarding this point, Grew wrote the following in a
letter dated September 30, 1943, to Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the US State Department Division of Far
Eastern Affairs:
When it comes to the emperor system – while this is clearly distinguishable from the current
individual Emperor – it is clear in my mind that it should be retained. This is because, as a symbol,
just as the emperor system previously served as an object of militaristic worship, so may it also
serve as a cornerstone for healthy and peaceful internal growth. (23)
Besides Grew, among the staff of the GHQ, Bonner Frank Fellers (1896 -1973), a contemporar y
Brigadier General in the US Army, likely had the same view of the Emperor and the imperial family
as Nitobe and Tsuda. As one of the “Bataan Boys,” he was one of General Douglas MacArthur’s most
trusted aides and had visited Japan about five times before the war. Having graduated from Earlham
College, a Quaker-founded university, he had a deep knowledge of Japanese culture through the research
of Lafcadio Hearn (aka, Yakumo Koizumi). He had been friends since before the war with Michi Kawai,
the founder of Keisen Jogakuen (a Christian school for girls that would develop into Keisen University),
who was also a student of Inazō Nitobe, the first Japanese Quaker, and often met her in occupied Japan (24).
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On October 2, 1945, the pro-Japanese Fellers submitted to MacAr thur the following research
report on the Emperor’s responsibility for the war, evidencing the unique views of the Emperor and the
Japanese, with his extensive knowledge of Japan.
Unlike Christians, the Japanese have no God with whom to commune. The Emperor is the living
symbol of the race in whom lies the virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of national
spirit, incapable of wrong or misdeeds. … It is a fundamental American concept that the people of
any nation have the inherent right to choose their own government. Were the Japanese people given
this opportunity, they would select the Emperor as the symbolic head of the state. (25)
MacArthur received the report, and stated the following in a confidential telegram to Dwight
Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the US Army, dated January 25, 1946, indicating the impact of the report as
follows:
He [The Emperor] is a symbol which unites all Japanese. Destroy him and the nation will
disintegrate. Practically all Japanese venerate him as the social Head of the State and believe rightly
or wrongly that the Potsdam Agreements [referring to the Potsdam Declaration (author’s addition)]
were intended to maintain him as the Emperor of Japan. (26)
As is generally known, the first principle of “MacArthur Notes” of February 3 of the same year, with
regard to the Emperor’s status, stipulated that the “Emperor is at the Head of the State.” It was ten days
earlier, however, that MacArthur had placed the Emperor in a dignified position as “a symbol which
unites all Japanese” and “the social head of the state.”
In connection with this, the previously mentioned Richard A. Poole, who was charged with drafting
the clauses relating to the Emperor at the GHQ, later stated the following in an inter view in 1992,
regarding the meaning of “symbol” in the Constitution of Japan and the position and role of a symbolic
emperor:
It is easy to associate the word ‘symbol’ with material objects such as flags and coats of arms, but
in English it also has a strong spiritual meaning. Japanese constitutional scholars seem to be very
particular about where the expression ‘symbol’ in Article 1 of the current Constitution came from.
It is a word that any American would immediately understand to mean ‘of high status and including
spiritual elements.’ I thought ‘symbol’ was a good expression of this.(27)
What we basically wanted to do regarding the Emperor was this: We wanted to establish the position
of the Emperor as having an important function as a monarch under the Constitution, despite it not
having any political power. In other words, we thought that it should not be merely a decoration.(28)
Thus, although the Japanese constitutional theor y on the Emperor’s position generally tends to
downplay the constitutional role of a symbolic emperor, arguing that the Emperor is nothing more than a
symbol, the drafters of the clauses on the Emperor at the GHQ were already attributing great significance
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to the “symbol” at that time (29).
4. Acceptance of the “Symbol” Provisions and Emperor Shōwa
Regarding the establishment of the Constitution of Japan, there are still those who currently argue
for the so-called “enforced constitution theory,” namely, that the Constitution of Japan is invalid because
it was enacted under coercion from the pressure and threat of the US occupation forces. Certainly, the
word “symbol” first appeared in the process of establishing the Constitution of Japan in the GHQ Draft,
which was presented to the Japanese side on February 13, 1946. Article 1 of that draft stipulates that
“The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the Unity of the people, deriving his position from
the sovereign will of the People, and from no other source.” Here, we can recognize something akin to a
prototype of Article 1 in the Emperor clause of the Constitution of Japan.
However, if we examine the subsequent response to the presentation of the draft on the Japanese side,
especially from Emperor Shōwa (Emperor Hirohito), historical facts emerge that cannot be explained
simply in terms of “enforcing” or “coercion” by the occupation forces. For example, Shigeru Yoshida, in

Kaisō Jūnen (“Ten Years’ Reminiscences”), recalls the period over which the government draft (“Outline
of a Draft for a Revised Constitution” (March 6 Draft)) was drafted, from the end of February to the
beginning of March, 1946, as follows:
The outline was published in the newspapers on the following day, [March] 7, and given that its
content was so radical at that time, it naturally came as a considerable shock to the public. During
this time, the part that was most problematic for the Cabinet was the word ‘symbol’ that was used
to express the position of the Emperor. While there was a great deal of debate among the cabinet
ministers over this, Prime Minister Shidehara sought an audience with His Majesty and reported
on the circumstances of the controversy over the negotiations with the General Headquarters
regarding the details of amendments to the Constitution. When [Shidehara] enquired about His
Majesty’s will in this regard, His Majesty himself stated that it was ‘acceptable to be a symbol.’
Encouraged by this news, all the ministers decided to accept the word ‘symbol.’ Thus, it could be
said that this matter was resolved entirely by imperial decision.(30)
In addition, according to the records of contemporar y postwar conser vative politician Kenz ō
Matsumura, at this time, MacArthur turned to Prime Minister Shidehara, requesting that “If Article 1
[of the Meiji Constitution] is left as it is, I do not know what the ‘countries to the north [i.e., the Soviet
Union (author’s note)],’ or ‘the countries to the south [i.e., Australia (Author’s note)],’ let alone the
United States, will say. … It is currently necessary to change Article 1 to such an extent that it stipulates
a British-style ‘national symbol.’” (31) Prime Minister Shidehara reported this to Emperor Shōwa, who is
quoted as saying the following in response:
Can we not accept this, if the other party says that it is so? May we not change Article 1 to be a ‘symbol’
like Britain? The heart of [this issue] is the heart of the people. That was the spirit of our ancestors. For
the line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal to rule, this too is to rule with the hearts of the people at
the heart. Therefore, I believe that it is good to become a ‘symbol of the state’ in the British style and to
entrust politics to the people. (32)
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Furthermore, a US source (“Political Reorganization of Japan” edited by the Government Section
of the GHQ) records the following regarding Prime Minister Shidehara’s report to the Emperor on the
morning of February 22, 1946:
As a last resor t, the Prime Minister, accompanied by Yoshida and Narahashi, asked for the
Emperor’s opinion. Hirohito did not hesitate. He advised them that he would fully support Shidehara
with the most radical reforms, even to the extent that the Emperor himself would be deprived of all
political power. (33)
In any case, it should be noted that Emperor Shōwa as a constitutional monarch under the Meiji
Constitution, in response to these reports from ministers, recognized the “symbol” provision proposed
by the GHQ as being compatible with Japan’s national character (or national polity: kokutai), and guided
the Shidehara Cabinet in the direction of accepting the GHQ’s proposal. In later years, at an Imperial
Household Agency press conference held at the Nasu Imperial Villa on August 23, 1977, Emperor Shōwa
gave an explanation as to why he had agreed with the adoption of the “symbol” provisions of Article 1,
citing the example of warlords financially supporting the imperial family in matters of national finance
during the Warring States period.
Article 1 [of the Constitution of Japan], that article fits the spirit of the Japanese national polity,
so I thought it was good. I believe national polity is a suitable term for how the Japanese imperial
family has maintained its long unbroken line since ancient times with the trust of the people. As
proof of this, history shows that during the period of decline of the imperial family, the warlords
of the Warring States period, Motonari Mouri, and Nobunaga Oda respected the imperial family
and offered huge fortunes to the imperial family in sympathy for their plight. The Japanese people
revered the imperial family, and the imperial family in turn considered the people to be their own
children who they cherished. The traditions of those generations have formed what we are today. (34)
Kijūrō Shidehara himself, who had reported to the Emperor during the negotiations, in his memoir

Gaikō Gojūnen (“Fifty Years of Diplomacy”) published in 1951, touches on the drafting process of the
Constitution of Japan, explaining that he thought the expression “symbol … was an eminently appropriate
word” in the light of the 1931 Statute of Westminster, as follows:
In the new constitution, the characters shōchō (“symbol”) were used to describe the Emperor as the
symbol of Japan. I thought that was an eminently appropriate word. The word ‘symbol’ was used in
the British Statute of Westminster, which is not particularly old because it came into force after the
Commonwealth. The Statute states that the King is a symbol of the sovereignty of the nations of the
Commonwealth ... i.e., Canada, Australia, South Africa and other countries. That was the key point
that I got from that. (35)
When it comes to the issue of the symbol provisions being presented by the GHQ, the memoir
recounts that Jōji Matsumoto, the Minister of State, said, “it felt strange that there were some literary
expressions appeared in the Constitution.” However, this anecdote seems to be the only example of

150 Japanese Society and Culture No.4 (2022)

an expression of doubt at this point. The recollections given in Gaikō Gojūnen are of great interest as
they suggest that not only Emperor Shōwa but also the Japanese government of the time had a positive
understanding of “symbol.”
5. The International Spread of the “Symbol”
In terms of comparative constitutional law, it is worth noting that since the 1970s, when Japan
achieved a high level of economic growth, there has been a notable trend in the constitutions of various
countries to specify that the head of state, whether the king or the president, is a “symbol of the state and
of the unity of the people” or a “symbol of the permanence of the state” (36).
Numerous examples of such provisions are available. For example, the 1978 Constitution of Spain
states that “the king is the head of state and a symbol of the unity and permanence of the state” (Article
56, paragraph 1), the 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal states that “His Majesty is the symbol
of the Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people” (Article 27), the 1992 Constitution of
Morocco (approved by referendum) states that “the king is a symbol of the unity of the Kingdom of
Morocco,” and the 1993 Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia states that “The King of Cambodia
shall be a symbol of unity and eternity of the nation” (Article 8). While the 1974 Swedish Constitution
contains no explicit statement on this matter, governmental memoranda characterize the king in the
position of head of state as “a representative of the unity of the people and a symbol of the nation (symbol

för landet)” (37).
Similar provisions can also be found in the constitutions of republics. For example, the 1972
Constitution of the Philippines stipulates that “the President of the Republic shall be the symbolic head
of state” (Article 7, section 1). In addition, the 1973 Constitution of the Republic of Sudan (Article 82),
the 1972 Constitution of Vanuatu (Article 31), and the 1995 Constitution of the Central African Republic
(Article 21) all state that the president is a “symbol of national unity” (38).
The provisions relating to symbols that appear in the constitutions of the countries shown above
can be seen as confirming not only the tenacity and success of the symbolic emperor system in the
Constitution of Japan, but also demonstrating its international spread. In this sense, the symbol provision
of Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan can be described as a valued source of a universal aspect of
“constitutional culture” and is perhaps unique in this regard.
6. Japan’s Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power
In his well-known work The Japanese and the Jews (first published in 1960), Isaiah BenDasan assesses
the Jews as being “politically inept,” stating in contrast that “the Japanese are political geniuses.” He
attempts to find a basis for this in the system of separating authority from power, which was formed in
the Kamakura Shogunate era; in other words, he is referring to the “coexistence of the imperial court
and the shogunate.” BenDasan’s argument regarding this is roughly as described below (39).
Whether in modernity or antiquity, whether east or west, it is a fact that some kind of religious ritual is
indispensable for ruling a nation. However, if ritual powers and administrative powers are not separated, a
dictatorship will inevitably arise. Both the Jewish prophet Zechariah, and Dante, the author of The Divine

Comedy, warned against this danger, but both warnings amounted to nothing more than dreams.
Before the modern separation of the three powers can be implemented, a separation of two powers
(i.e., ritual and administrative powers) must first be established. It is meaningless to formally establish

A Study of the Origin, Acceptance, and International Spread of the ‘Symbol’ within the Constitution of Japan:
Japan’s Approach to Restoring the Separation of Authority and Power 151

a separation of the three powers in locales where the separation of the two powers is lacking. This ideal
political system based on the separation of the two powers was only to be found in Japan in a form of the
system based on the “coexistence of the imperial court and the shogunate,” which is not in evidence
anywhere else in the world. Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon, and Nobunaga Oda all tried to assume both
authority and power, but all ultimately failed. The founder of the Kamakura Shogunate, Minamoto
no Yoritomo, took the separation of ritual and administration as a matter of course; he was the first
politician in history to adopt such a stance by keeping the shogunate as a strictly practical administrative
organization, leaving the ritual functions to the imperial cour t. BenDasan praises the system of
“coexistence of the imperial court and the shogunate” that began with Yoritomo as follows:
The governments of medieval Europe, with their mixing of rituals, administrative justice, and court
life, cannot in fact be called ‘governments.’ By comparison, the shogunate, or rather Yoritomo’s
government, was a marvel. It was likely a model for the world at that time. This is by no means a
conclusion that I have reached in isolation. All foreigners who know the history of Japan even a little
will have the same strong feelings. (40)
By establishing a dual structure in which only ritual or honorific power was given to the imperial
court, and actual political power was held by the shogunate, the Japanese style of political governance
gained a firm stability. The pre-Meiji emperor system survived for a long time because the Emperor
never held actual political power, except in ancient Japanese history. The Japanese had already realized
Japan’s unique system of governance over more than 700 years, separating the “symbol” of the emperor
from the supreme holder of political power.
In connection with this, we may recall Walter Bagehot’s The English Constitution, as mentioned
earlier, insofar as his analysis of the British constitutional system of the Victorian era identifies its
traditional strengths or merits as being comprised of two elements: the “dignified parts,” which are “those
which excite and preserve the reverence of the population” and the “efficient parts,” which are “those
by which [the state], in fact, works and rules” (41). Beyond this, he characterizes the basic structure of
the British constitutional monarchy in the latter half of the 19th century as an ingenious mixture of the
“dignified parts” that the king reigns over, and the “efficient parts” that are governed by a Cabinet led by
a prime minister.
As is by now clear, at the time of its establishment, the Constitution of Japan was not intended to
abolish the emperor system itself, nor was its purpose to unify both authority and power under the
Emperor as in the Meiji Constitution. In conclusion, the symbolic emperor system based on popular
sovereignty under the Constitution of Japan is intended to strictly separate the “authority” of the symbolic
emperor from the “power” of popular sovereignty, while also allowing both to coexist in harmony(42).
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